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Key points/questions
• OECD-DAC ‘traditional’ aid as instrument for reduction in 
policy space in Africa
• Long gradual process with contradictions and diverse outcomes
• Influence extends from economic policies to social and political 
transformation projects – ‘good governance’ agenda
• An understanding of the pitfalls with ‘traditional’ aid may help 
understand the current excitement about Chinese aid…
• ‘Emerging’ donors could reverse or attenuate this process but 
not yet
• Does China really threaten ‘good governance’ in Africa?
ODA flows: main trends and facts
• Trends:
– From 1970s, steady increase, especially in the 1980s 
(emergency and ‘adjustment’ aid)
– 1990s: aid ‘fatigue’Æ decline in real terms, especially 
hurting poorest countries (LLDCs)
– Late 1990s-now: Push from New Aid Agenda,
– Also, 2002 until now: new injections mainly driven by 
War on Terror, security concerns and the accounting of 
debt relief
• Despite these shifting trends, generally significant and 
systematic increase in number of official donors 
(around 200 now), NGOs (37,000?) and recipient 
countries (180 for 100 major official donors)
• Recently, over 35,000 annual official aid transactions 
(200 per country)
Aid delivery systems and perverse effects
• Complexity and fragmentation Æ high transaction 
costs
• Coordination failure and overlaps across donors
• New reforms (towards programme/sector 
assistance and budget support) introduce new 
layers, adding to existing TC and multiplication of 
tools
• Aid-dependent governments enter logic of ‘aid 
maximization’ at the expense of longer-term 
development 
• Volatility reinforces short/medium term logic
Aid volatility in Africa
Average ODA (commitments) p.a. (US$2006 constant) and volatility (CV %): 1965‐2007
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Perverse effects on state capacity 
(thus government ‘effectiveness’)
• Distortions in government pay structures (per diems, top-ups, etc.) 
Æ perverse incentive systems
• Distortions in budgeting system (off-budgets, investment/recurrent 
balance, duplication, etc.) 
• Fragmented and complex aid delivery system Æ inefficient time 
management ÆMozambican examples (Health Ministry with 400 
official donor projects), on average, 200 separate (annual) aid 
missions/visits in each country (sample of 14 recipient countries) Æ
new aid agenda poses unrealistic and highly demanding targets 
• ‘Brain drain’ towards donor agencies and projects especially in 
countries with scarce skilled labour 
• Reduction in revenue raising capacity through multiplication of 
efforts to manage aid and debt
But new aid agenda closely linked to ‘good 
governance’ agenda: the post-Washington 
consensus
• In light of SAP’s failure, focus on institutions Æ
‘getting institutions right’
• Aid effectiveness debate in 1990s Æ role of 
institutions and public sector reform
• Why ‘good governance’?
– Fiduciary aspect (need for accountability and 
transparency)
– Alleged positive correlation between ‘good 
governance’ and development
New Aid Agenda deepens loss of policy space induced 
by aid flows (through conditions and policy ‘advice’)
Areas of loss:
• Fiscal (deficit ceilings), Monetary 
(inflation targets), Exchange rate 
(mega devaluations and flexibility), 
Privatisation (all domains), Trade and 
industry (liberalisation and no 
industrial policy), Capital account 
liberalisation, Agricultural policies 
(no protection, market deregulation)
• …and now more on institutional 
development (Anglo-American 
governance model)
• List of conditions ↑
 
: IMF avg 6 in 
1970s, 10 in 1980s and 26 in 1990s
Channels of shrinkage
1. Imposed conditions 
through ‘forced consensus’
Æ self-censorship
2. Strong influence of ‘blocs’ 
of few donors (dominated 
by WB/IMF, USA, UK 
and EC)
3. Gradual ideological 
conversion of politicians 
and bureaucrats (especially 
in Ministries of Finance 
and Planning)
The new governance agenda: Washington confusion?
Source: Rodrik 2006 
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/lessons%20of%20the%201990s%20review%20_jel_.pdf
The fallacy of the ‘good governance’ – 
development link
(Mushtaq Khan, various papers) watch his lecture on 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EdZOltzT8OE&feature=related
Converging developing 
countries (East Asia, etc.)
Or?
…A lot of recent empirical research shows that the alleged 
‘aid-policy’ econometric link is inexistent
Source: Roodman, D (2004). The Anarchy of Numbers: Aid, Development, and Cross-country Empirics, CGD Working Paper n. 32
Ambiguities and contradictions in the 
incorporation of  ‘good governance’
Definitions
– Lack of consensus on what is 
meant by ‘good governance’ / 
myriad indicators
– Tension between focus on 
corruption/politics or investment 
climate
– Lack of consensus on ‘good 
enough governance’ and 
associated priorities
Contradictions
• The starlets of DAC donors (Uganda, 
Mozambique) broadly characterised by 
slippage in fundamental aspects of the 
GG agenda
– Evidence of criminalisation of the state 
(Mozambique)
– Lack of progress in justice reform
– Privatization as primitive accumulation
– Limitations to pluralist politics 
(Uganda)
– Military operations (Northern Uganda, 
DRC)
– and Ethiopia, new darling of US 
aid…?
And list continues
The persistence 
and deepening of 
‘structural 
conditionality’ 
(IMF)
Source: IMF website, country Senegal, letter of intent
Top five donors Joint 
%
% top 
2
Uganda
WB (26%), USA (19%),
 
EC (9%), UK (9%), 
Netherlands (6%)
69 45
Mozamb.
WB (16%), EC (12%), USA (10%),
 
AfDF (8%), 
Sweden (6%)
52 28
Tanzania
WB (30%), UK (13%), EC (10%),
 
Netherlands (7%), 
USA (6%)
66 43
Ethiopia
WB (27%), USA (24%), UK (7%),
 
EC (6%), AfDF 
(4%)
68 51
Senegal
WB (25%), France (22%), EC (8%),
 
AfDF (8%), 
Japan (8%)
71 47
Niger
EC (23%), WB
 
(19%),
 
France (12%), AfDF (8%), USA 
(6%)
68 42
Sources of aid for selected African countries (2004-6)
Source: own elaboration from DAC database
Forced
 
consensus:
 From
 
the
 
Ministry
 
to
 
the
 
IMF/WB and
 
viceversa 
• Growing ‘incest’ between BWI and African governments Some 
examples of top finance bureaucrats with employment history in 
BWI: Antoinette Sayeh (Liberia, BM), Goodall Gondwe 
(Malawi, FMI, ADB), Abou-Bakar Traore (Mali, FMI), Luisa 
Diogo (Mozambique, BM), Trevor Manuel (SA, FMI) and many 
more since 1980s
• More importantly, even greater number of upper-middle-level 
technocrats have attended training programmes offered or 
sponsored by BWI and like-minded donors (WB, USAID, DFID) 
through WBI, AERC, and Anglo-American academic institutions
• The WB has complemented this with ambitious support to 
research capacities and data collection at govt level
Source: Van Waeyenberge (2008) 
http://www.soas.ac.uk/cdpr/seminars/43473.pdf
The ‘sovereign frontier’ (Harrison) and 
governance discourse
Government, 
Parliament, 
etc,
Donors (esp. 
WB, IMF)
Aid 
management 
systems 
centred in 
Finance 
Ministries 
and sector 
Planning 
budget depts. 
With the liberal 
governance agenda the 
‘sovereign frontier’ 
space, where donors 
‘participate’ in policy 
processes and 
decisions, has 
expanded
Persistent Risks for African countries in the New Aid Agenda: 
further reducing bargaining power
• Confusing guide: PWC as ‘do as much as you can 
as soon as you can’
• Selectivity ex-postÆ reinforcing ‘forced
consensus’ and self-fulfilling prophecies
• Donor ‘harmonization’Æ ‘cartelization’ around 
SWAPs and budget support?
• From content to processÆ SWAPs and direct
budget support come with strings that reinforce
policy micro-management by DAC donorsÆ less
bargaining power for SSA governments?
Alternatives to increase bargaining power: 
‘emerging’ donors (China, India, Brazil, Venezuela…) 
Advantages and challenges of Chinese aid to Africa
• Chinese aid is hard to measure but still very small relative to OECD ($500 
million p.a.? $1 bn p.a.? $4bn? $6.5bn over the last few years in 800 
projects?)
• Alternative funding to programmes (and countries) otherwise neglected by 
Western-donor bloc – More focus on basic infrastructure and investment 
projects with long maturity (gap left by DAC donors)…building stadium?
• Less bureaucracy and transaction costs Æ more cost-effective and faster 
delivery
• Substantial aid tying (but cost effective) – fairly obvious (and not new) but 
at least open/transparent promotion of Chinese interests
• More policy space and bargaining power for African governments if 
additional aid reduces dependence on ‘Anglo-American’ like-minded 
donor bloc (see next slide)
• Potential for technical cooperation at level of long-term strategic planning 
– learning from Chinese experience? More suitable technical assistance?
• But…Issue of alleged support to ‘rogue’ states (e.g. Sudan, Zimbabwe, 
Chad): a threat to good governance ‘achievements’? Who defines ‘rogue’?
‘You never hear the Chinese saying that they will not 
finish a project because the government has not done 
enough to tackle corruption. If they are going to build 
a road, then it will be built’
(official of Kenyan government cited in Alden et al. 
2008, p.119) 
Yes, spectacular growth…
Source: own elaboration in Oya (2008) at http://www.soas.ac.uk/cdpr/publications/dv/44011.pdf
But relative magnitude of Chinese aid: 
US$ million 2004
Source: own elaboration from DAC database and various sources on Chinese aid also cited in Oya (2008) at 
http://www.soas.ac.uk/cdpr/publications/dv/44011.pdf
A Beijing consensus for Africa?
Aid modalities
1. Predictability – long-term 
focus
2. Infrastructure
3. No interference in 
‘internal’ affairs
4. Package deal (aid + trade + 
investment)
5. Symbolic diplomacy
Chinese instructive example: a 
development model?
• Cooper Ramo’s triad (innovation, 
quality of life, nationalism)
• Importance of capital accumulation
• Large-scale infrastructure
• Coordination governance 
capabilities and centralisation
• Focus on (rural) industrialization and 
manufacturing skills
• Careful management of foreign 
capital and competition
• The contradictions of accelerated 
capitalist development (class-based 
inequality)
Can ‘emerging’
 
donors (China) make the difference?
1. Volume needs to increase massively relative to DAC 
aid
2. Co-optation by DAC blocs avoided? Moves towards 
coordination and ‘partnerships’ (World Bank-China)
3. Genuine interest in promoting ‘alternative’ economic 
policies? No applicable ‘Chinese model’…Chinese 
‘exceptionalism’?
4. Perception of increasing bargaining power may 
reduce subservience to ‘traditional’ donors (a 
development bank in Mozambique?) even if 
‘emerging aid’ is not voluminous
Diplomacy and business
Resources
New languages and challenges
